1. Judicial Obligation and the Rule of Law
1.1. The positivist distinction
1.2. Hart on judicial obligation
1.3. The truly liberal answer
1.4. Fuller on the rule of law
1.5. Dworkin's logic of legal standards
1.6. The soundest theory of the law
1.7. A historical enquiry
2. Politics and History
2.1. Setting up segregation: 1902-1948
2.2. Setting up apartheid: 1948-1978
2.3. The crisis of apartheid: 1978-1990
2.4. The judges and their critics
3. Adjudication and Racial Segregation
3.1. Separate but equal
3.2. Separate but not substantially unequal?
3.3. The counterpointer test
3.4. Analogical reasoning
3.5. The death of a principle?
4. Adjudication and National Security
4.1. The majority in Liversidge
4.2. Lord Atkin's dissent
4.3. Understanding Liversidge
4.4. The reception of Liversidge
5. Entrenchment and Dissent
5.1. Rossouw as 'authority
5.2. A question of jurisdiction
5.3. The status of audi alteram partem
5.4. A matter of practice
6. The Common Law Revival
6.1. The judicial assumption
6.2. Exorcizing Liversidge
6.3. Bail, security, and rights
6.4. A common law conception of statutory intention
7. The War against Law
7.1. The common law approach and the state of emergency
7.2. The plain fact approach and the state of emergency
8. The English Experience
8.1. The assertion of jurisdiction
8.2. Liversidge in England
8.3. The dichotomy in English administrative law
8.4. A constitutional basis
9. Positivism and the Plain Fact Approach
9.1. Judicial attitudes and judicial choice
9.2. Hobbes and the plain fact approach
9.3. Austin's pragmatic contradiction
9.4. The pragmatic contradiction in Dicey and Wade
9.5. Hart and Raz: An ideal of fidelity to law?
10. The Legitimacy of Law
10.1. The disappearance of law
10.2. The rule of law and democracy
10.3. Conclusion
Appendix A: Legislation and Unreasonableness
Appendix B: The Plain Fact Approach: 1970-1990.