Vagueness in law / Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott.

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000.

21874

Law -- Interpretation and construction.

Law -- Language.

Philosophy.

Rule of law.

Vagueness (Philosophy)

1. Introduction: 1. What is in the book

What is not in the book

2. Linguistic indeterminacy: 1. The Twilight zone

2. Interpretive orthodoxy and the critical predicament

3. Deconstruction

4. Context

5. Wittgenstein

6. Conclusion

3. Sources of indeterminacy: 1. Vagueness

2. Imprecision

3. Open texture

4. Incompleteness

5. Incommensurability

6. Immensurability

7. Contestability

8. Family resemblances

9. Dummy standards

10. Pragmatic vagueness

11. Ambiguity

12. Beyond words

4. Vagueness and legal theory: 1. Legal theories

2. Kelsen: the norm as a frame

3. Dworkin: the right answer thesis

4. Juridical bivalence

5. Conclusion

5. How not to solve the paradox of the heap: 1. Semanticist solutions

2. Higher-order vagueness

3. The Paradox of trivalence

4. How vague is a vague word?

5. No clear borderline cases?

6. Conclusion: can the paradox be dissolved

6. The Epistemic theory of vagueness

2. Meaning and use

3. Use as a guide to action

4. The Vagueness of evaluation

5. Context dependence and vagueness

6. Conclusion: putting a price on bivalence

7. Vagueness and similarity: 1. The Boundary model

2. Vagueness as a problem of social choice

3. Incommensurability and boundaries

4. The Similarity model

5. Conclusion

8. Vagueness and interpretation: 1. Hersules and the quietest rave

2. The Resources of the law

3. Dworkin and juridical bivalence

4. Interpretation, intention, and understanding

5. Interpretation and indeterminacy

6. Interpretation and invention

7. Conclusion: the charm of legalism

9. The Impossibility of the rule of law:

1. The Context of the ideal

2. Vagueness and arbitrary government

3. Reconstructing the ideal

4. Three puzzles

5. Resolution.

Includes bibliography and index.

Oxford scholarship online. Law collection.

0198268408

x, 213 p. ; 24 cm